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Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and the General Court
Reported Period 01.03.2017-01.12.2017
Compiled and edited by Lorenzo Squintani 
Assistant professor of European and Economic Law at the University of 
 Groningen, the Netherlands
l.squintani@rug.nl
 Overview of the Judgments
 Waste Water as Renewable Energy Source
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 2 March 2017 in Case C-4/16 – J. D. 
v Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the second 
subparagraph of Article 2(a) of the Renewable Energy Sources Directive. In 
the national proceedings J.D. challenged the decisions of the Chairman of the 
Energy Regulatory Office rejecting J.D.’s application for an extension in respect 
of the small-scale hydropower plant on the grounds that only hydropower plant 
producing energy obtained from wave, current and tide and the downward 
flow of rivers could be regarded as plants producing energy from renewable 
sources. This was due to the fact J.D.’s small-scale hydropower plant is located at 
the point of discharge of industrial waste water from another plant, which was not 
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involved in electricity production. The Court of Appeal, Warsaw (Poland), hearing 
the case decided to add the Court of Justice to know, in essence, whether the con-
cept of ‘energy from renewable sources’, in the second  subparagraph of Article 
2(a) of Directive 2009/28, must be  interpreted as  covering energy generated by a 
small-scale hydroelectric power station, which is not a pumped-storage power 
station or a hydroelectric power station with a pumping installation, sited at the 
point of discharge of industrial waste water from another plant which previously 
used the water for its own purposes.
 Key Findings
31 As was stated, in essence, by the Advocate General in points 36 to 38 of 
his Opinion, it follows from those factors that all hydropower constitutes 
energy from renewable sources, within the meaning of the second sub-
paragraph of Article 2(a) of Directive 2009/28, whether it is generated by 
hydropower provided by a natural water flow, or whether it is generated 
from hydropower provided from an artificial water flow, with the excep-
tion of electricity generated from pumped storage units using water that 
has previously been pumped uphill.
33 To exclude the concept of hydropower produced from renewable sourc-
es, for the purposes of Directive 2009/28, all electricity generated from 
hydropower provided from an artificial water flow, and that on the sole 
ground that it concerns water flow of that type, as is suggested, in es-
sence, by the Polish Government, is not only contrary to the intention 
of the eu legislature, as was stated in paragraphs 26 to 31 of the present 
judgment, but also conflicts with the achievement of those obje ctives.
36 In order to avoid any risk of circumvention, it is nevertheless necessary that 
the uphill activity, which is at the source of that artificial water flow, does 
not exist solely to create that water flow for the purposes of its uphill ex-
ploitation in order to produce electricity. Therefore, in particular, electricity 
produced from hydropower provided from an artificial water flow where 
the latter was created uphill by pumping with the sole aim of producing that 
electricity downstream does not come within the concept of hydropower 
produced from renewable sources, for the purposes of Directive 2009/28.
 Operator’s Fault Prevents ghg Emissions from being Property 
Rights
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 8 March 2017 in Case C-321/15 – 
ArcelorMittal Rodange et Schifflange sa v État du Grand-duché de Luxembourg
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 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the ets Direc-
tive. In the dispute in the main proceedings ‘ArcelorMittal’ challenged the decision 
of the Minister with responsibility for Sustainable Development and Infrastruc-
ture of Luxembourg requiring that company to surrender, without compensation, 
80,922 unused greenhouse gas emissions allowances. These emissions were grant-
ed in 2012, only because ArcelorMittal had failed to communicate that the activities 
of its installation had been suspended since the end of 2011 for an indefinite period. 
The Constitutional court hearing the case asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, 
whether the ets Directive must be interpreted as precluding a national provi-
sion which allows the competent authorities to require to surrender without com-
pensation emissions allowances which have been issued but were not used by an 
operator.
 Judgment
31 It is for the referring court to ascertain whether in the present case 
 ArcelorMittal actually suspended activities at its installation in Schif-
flange as of November 2011 and whether that suspension could be classi-
fied as a cessation of activities for the purposes of Article 13(6) of the Law 
of 2004.
32 If that is the case, Directive 2003/87 does not preclude the competent 
authority from adopting, in circumstances such as those at issue in the 
main proceedings, a decision ordering the surrender without compen-
sation of the emissions allowances. Where an installation has ceased 
its activities at a date prior to that of the allocation of emissions allow-
ances, those allowances clearly cannot be used in order to account for 
greenhouse gas emissions which can no longer be produced by that 
installation.
36 Accordingly, Directive 2003/87 must be interpreted as not precluding na-
tional legislation which allows the competent authority to require the 
surrender, without full or partial compensation, of unused emissions al-
lowances which have been improperly issued to an operator, as a result 
of the failure by the latter to comply with the obligation to inform the 
competent authority in due time of the cessation of the operation of an 
installation.
38 Thus, the surrender of those allowances would not mean the expropria-
tion of an asset which already formed an integral part of the operator’s 
property, but simply the withdrawal of the act allocating the allowances, 
on account of the failure to comply with the conditions laid down in 
Directive 2003/87.
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 On the Consideration of Data Other than Those Relating to the 
Hazards Arising from the Intrinsic Properties of the Substances 
Concerned under reach (i)
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 March 2017 in Case C-323/15P – 
Polynt SpA v European Chemicals Agency
 Subject Matter
In this appeal, Polynt seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court 
of the European Union in Polynt and Sitre v echa (T-134/13), by which the Gen-
eral Court dismissed its action seeking the annulment in part of Decision 
ed/169/2012 of the European Chemicals Agency (echa) of 18 December 2012 con-
cerning the inclusion of substances of very high concern in the list of candidate 
substances, in so far as it concerns cyclohexane-1,2-dicarboxylic anhydride (ec 
No 201-604-9), cis-cyclohexane-1,2-dicarboxylic anhydride (ec No 236-086-3) 
and trans-cyclohexane-1,2-dicarboxylic anhydride (ec No 238-009-9) (together, 
‘hhpa’). On request from the Netherlands, hhpa, which is a cyclic acid anhydride 
used, among others, as an intermediate or monomer in industrial processes, 
echa identified it as a substance of very high concern and included in Annex 
xiv to the reach Regulation. This is due to the fact that hhpa may cause allergy 
or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties if inhaled. Among the grounds for 
its appeal, Polynt alleged errors in the interpretation and application of Article 
57( f ) of the reach Regulation. The Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, but 
corrected the General Court as regards one point.
 Key Findings
44 Therefore, the General Court erred in law in holding, in essence, that 
Article 57(f) of the reach Regulation excludes, in principle, any consid-
eration of data other than those relating to the hazards arising from the 
intrinsic properties of the substances concerned, such as those relating 
to human exposure reflecting the risk management measures in force.
 On the Consideration of Data Other than Those Relating to the 
Hazards Arising from the Intrinsic Properties of the Substances 
Concerned under reach (ii)
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 March 2017 in Case C-324/15P – 
Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH and Polynt SpA v European Chemicals Agency
 89Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
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 Subject Matter
In this appeal, Hitachi and Polynt seeks to have set aside the judgment of the Gen-
eral Court of the European Union in Polynt and Sitre v echa (T-134/13), by which 
the General Court dismissed its action seeking the annulment in part of Decision 
ed/169/2012 of the European Chemicals Agency (echa) of 18 December 2012 con-
cerning the inclusion of substances of very high concern in the list of candidate 
substances, in so far as it concerns hexahydromethylphthalic anhydride (ec No 
247-094-1), hexahydro-4-methylphthalic anhydride (ec No 243-072-0), hexahydro-
1-methylphthalic anhydride (ec No 256-356-4) and hexahydro-3-methylphthalic 
anhydride (ec No 260-566-1) (together, ‘mhhpa’). On request from the Nether-
lands, mhhpa, which is a cyclic acid anhydride used, among others, as an inter-
mediate or monomer in industrial processes, echa identified it as a substance 
of very high concern and included in Annex xiv to the reach Regulation. This 
is due to the fact that mhhpa may cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breath-
ing difficulties if inhaled. Among the grounds for its appeal, Hitachi and Polynt 
alleged errors in the interpretation and application of Article 57( f ) of the reach 
Regulation. The Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, but corrected the General 
Court as regards one point.
 Key Findings
44 Therefore, the General Court erred in law in holding, in essence, that 
Article 57(f) of the reach Regulation excludes, in principle, any consid-
eration of data other than those relating to the hazards arising from the 
intrinsic properties of the substances concerned, such as those relating 
to human exposure reflecting the risk management measures in force.
 On Cost Allocation of Waste Treatment Activities in Croatia
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 30 March 2017 in Case C-335/16 – vg 
Čistoća d.o.o. v Đuro Vladika and Ljubica Vladika
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the polluter-
pays principle and of Article 14(1) of the Waste Directive (Directive 2008/98/ec). 
The request has been made in the course of proceedings between vg Čistoća d.o.o., 
a municipal waste management company, and Mr Đuro Vladika and Mrs Lju-
bica Vladika, users of a waste management service, concerning the payment of 
invoices for the collection and management of municipal waste between October 
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2013 and September 2014. The defendants in the main proceedings object to the 
payment of the items on the invoices relating to the payment for separate col-
lections, recycling and the disposal of waste left unlawfully in the environment, 
and to the payment of a special levy intended to finance capital investment by 
the waste management company in recycling operations. The Velika Gorica 
Municipal Court, Croatia, essentially asks whether Article 14 and Article 15(1) 
of the Directive preclude requiring waste management service users to pay 
a fee calculated on the basis of the volume of the container provided for them, 
and not on the basis of the waste actually transported, and to pay an additional 
levy intended to finance investments necessary for the processing of the waste 
collected.
 Judgment
Article 14 and Article 15(1) of Directive 2008/98/ec of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain 
Directives must, as eu law currently stands, be interpreted as not precluding 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, for 
the purposes of financing an urban waste management and disposal service, 
provides for a price calculated on the basis of an estimate of the volume of 
waste generated by users of that service, and not on the basis of the quantity of 
waste which they have actually produced and presented for collection, as well 
as for the payment by users, in their capacity as waste holders, of an additional 
levy intended to finance capital investments necessary for the processing of 
waste, including the recycling thereof. It is, however, incumbent on the refer-
ring court to verify, on the basis of the matters of fact and law placed before it, 
whether this results in the imposition on certain ‘holders’ of costs which are 
manifestly disproportionate to the volumes or nature of the waste that they 
are liable to produce. Accordingly, the national court may take into account, 
inter alia, criteria relating to the type of property that the users occupy, its sur-
face area and use, the productive capacity of the ‘holders’, the volume of the 
containers provided to the users, and the frequency of collection, in so far as 
those parameters are liable to have a direct impact on the amount of the costs 
of waste management.
 On the Financing of N2000 Areas Co-owned by Private Parties  
and the State
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 30 March 2017 in Case C-315/16 – 
József Lingurár tegen Miniszterelnökséget vezető miniszter
 91Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
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This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 42 
and 46 of Council Regulation (ec) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support 
for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(eafrd). The request has been made in proceedings between József Lingurár and 
the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Hungary, concerning the decision refusing 
to grant Mr Lingurár support for a Natural 2000 forest area which he owns. This 
was due to the fact that the State owned 0.182% of that area. The Supreme Court 
of Hungary, competent in the main proceedings, asked, in essence, whether the 
first sentence of Article 42(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005 must be interpreted as 
precluding the complete exclusion of a Natura 2000 forest area from entitlement 
to the support provided for in Article 36(b)(iv) of that regulation on the ground 
that a small part of that area is owned by the State, irrespective of the ratio of the 
size of the part owned by the State to the size of the part owned by a private owner.
 Key Findings
22 In this case, the interpretation of the first sentence of Article 42(1) of 
Regulation No 1698/2005 which follows from the national legislation 
leads, in particular in the circumstances of the main proceedings, to a 
reversal of the relationship between the rule laid down by that provision 
and the exception set out in Article 30(4)(a) of Regulation No 1974/2006. 
The principle established in Article 42(1) of Regulation No 1698/2005 is 
that Natura 2000 support is to be paid to private owners and their as-
sociations. However, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, even 
though only a negligible part of the forest area in question is owned by 
the State, the refusal to pay any support to the private owner who owns 
most of that area effectively makes the exception the rule.
35 Consequently, the exclusion of only the plot or hectare owned in part 
by the State from Natura 2000 compensatory support for a forest area 
eligible for such support—or even no exclusion at all if that part is neg-
ligible—would comply with the principle of proportionality, unlike the 
complete exclusion of that area without any regard being had to the ratio 
of the size of the part of that area owned by the State to the size of the 
part owned by the private owner.
 On Air Quality in Bulgaria
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 April 2017 in Case C-488/15 – 
European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria
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This case concerns an infringement procedure brought by the European Commis-
sion against Bulgaria for breach of Articles 13 and 23 of the Air Quality Direc-
tive. Following Bulgaria’s failure to rely on Article 22 of the Directive to obtain an 
extension of the deadline to comply with the eu quality standards, the Commis-
sion started an action for the systematic and consistent failure to comply with 
the provisions of the Directive. Bulgaria did not deny that it had failed to fulfil 
its obligations under Article 13 of the Directive. Yet it contended the fact that the 
Commission’s action before the Court of Justice had a temporal scope which is 
broader than that in the reasoned opinion. Moreover, as regards the complaint 
that Bulgaria had breached article 23 of the Directive, this Member State replied 
that the concept of ‘as short as possible’ under this provision should be interpreted 
taking into account the two-year period provided for communicating the plans to 
the Commission after the end of the year the first exceedance was observed.
 Key Findings
46 While the data on air quality for 2014 amount to events which took place 
after the reasoned opinion of 11 July 2014, those events are of the same 
kind as those to which the opinion referred and constitute the same 
conduct.
47 Consequently, those data, which came to the Commission’s knowledge 
after the reasoned opinion of 11 July 2014 was issued, could legitimately 
be mentioned by it in finding that the Republic of Bulgaria had failed to 
comply with the provisions of Article 13(1) of, in conjunction with Annex 
xi to, Directive 2008/50, also in relation to 2014.
50 In addition, since the Court may consider of its own motion whether the 
conditions laid down in Article 258 tfeu for an action for failure to ful-
fil obligations to be brought are satisfied (see judgments of 15 January 
2002, Commission v Italy, C-439/99, eu:c:2002:14, paragraph 8, and of 22 
September 2016, Commission v Czech Republic, C-525/14, eu:c:2016:714, 
paragraph 14), it must be ascertained whether, by its first complaint, the 
Commission is entitled to declare that the Republic of Bulgaria failed to 
fulfil its obligations as from 2007.
52 However, according to the Court’s case-law, the Commission has standing 
to seek a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations 
which were created in the original version of an eu measure, subse-
quently amended or repealed, and which were maintained in force under 
the provisions of a new eu measure. Conversely, the subject matter of the 
dispute cannot be extended to obligations arising under new provisions 
which do not correspond to those arising under the original version of 
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essential procedural requirements of infringement proceedings (judg-
ments of 24 May 2011, Commission v Portugal, C-52/08, eu:c:2011:337, 
paragraph 42, and of 10 September 2015, Commission v Poland, C-36/14, 
not published, eu:c:2015:570, paragraph 24).
55 In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the complaint alleging 
an infringement of the provisions of Article 13(1) of, in conjunction with 
Annex xi to, Directive 2008/50 is admissible for the period from 2007 to 
2014 inclusive.
74 In those circumstances, it must be found that the Republic of Bulgaria 
was not exempted from the obligation to comply with the limit values 
until 11 June 2011.
76 When it has been objectively found that a Member State has failed to 
fulfil its obligations under the feu Treaty or secondary law, it is irrele-
vant whether the failure to fulfil obligations is the result of intention or 
negligence on the part of the Member State responsible, or of technical 
difficulties encountered by it (see judgments of 1 October 1998, Commis-
sion v Spain, C-71/97, eu:c:1998:455, paragraph 15, and of 4 September 
2014, Commission v Greece, C-351/13, not published, eu:c:2014:2150, para-
graph 23).
77 Consequently, Republic of Bulgaria’s argument relating to its socio- 
economic situation cannot be accepted.
112 It follows from the wording of Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50 and from 
the broad logic of that provision that the obligation to keep the exceed-
ance period for the limit values as short as possible is wholly separate 
from the obligation to communicate the plans to the Commission. Conse-
quently, the third subparagraph of Article 23(1) of that directive does not 
confer any additional period on the Member State concerned for them to 
adopt appropriate measures and for those measures to take effect.
 On the Notions of Mitigation Measures and Cumulative Effects 
under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 27 October 2017 in Case C-142/16 – 
European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany
 Subject Matter
This case concerns an infringement procedure against Germany. According to 
the European Commission, by authorising the construction of a coal-fired power 
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station in Moorburg, near Hamburg (Germany), without conducting an appro-
priate and comprehensive assessment of its implications, the Federal Republic 
of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(3) and (4) of the 
Habitats Directive. Germany had performed an environmental impact assess-
ment and concluded that that authorisation was compatible with the conserva-
tion objectives of the Natura 2000 areas in view of the undertaking given by the 
operator to install a second fish ladder approximately 30 km from the plant, by 
the Geesthacht weir, intended to compensate for fish killed during the operation 
of the cooling mechanism, which draws large quantities of water from the river in 
order to cool the Moorburg plant (‘the fish ladder’). According to the Commission, 
Germany wrongly classified the fish ladder as a mitigating measure, and, second-
ly, had failed to take into account cumulative effects with other relevant projects.
 Key Findings
36 That fish ladder was intended to increase migratory fish stocks by allow-
ing those species to reach their breeding areas, along the middle and up-
per reaches of the Elbe, more quickly. Increasing stocks in this manner 
was expected to compensate for the fish deaths near the Moorburg plant 
so that the conservation objectives of the Natura 2000 areas upstream of 
the plant would not be significantly affected.
37 However, it is clear that the impact assessment itself did not contain 
definitive data regarding the effectiveness of the fish ladder, and merely 
stated that its effectiveness could only be confirmed following several 
years of monitoring.
38 It must therefore be held that, at the time the authorisation was granted, 
the fish ladder, even though it was intended to reduce direct significant 
effects on the Natura 2000 areas situated upstream of the Moorburg 
plant, could not guarantee beyond all reasonable doubt, together with 
the other measures referred to in paragraph 35 of the present judgment, 
that that plant would not adversely affect the integrity of the site, within 
the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.
63 It follows from the foregoing considerations that, by failing to assess 
appropriately the cumulative effects resulting from the Moorburg plant 
together with the Geesthacht pumped-storage power plant, the Federal 
Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Under Arti-
cle 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.
67 In those circumstances, it must be held that the run-of-river hydroelectric 
power plant at the Geesthacht weir did not constitute ‘another project’ 
within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. Accordingly, 
the second part of the second complaint must be rejected.
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 On the Concept of ‘placing on the market’ under Article 5 of the 
reach Regulation
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 27 April 2017 in Case C-535/15 – 
Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg v Jost Pinckernelle
 Subject Matter
This case concerns a preliminary reference made in proceedings between the City 
of Hamburg and Jost Pinckernelle, concerning the export of chemicals outside the 
territory of the European Union which were imported into that territory without 
being registered in accordance with, in particular, Article 5 of the reach Regula-
tion. The referring court asked, in essence, whether Article 5 of the reach Regula-
tion is to be interpreted as meaning that substances which have not be registered 
at the time of their import into the territory of the European Union in accordance 
with that regulation can be exported outside that territory.
 Key Findings
41 It follows from the foregoing that the export of a substance to a third 
country cannot be considered as the ‘placing on the market’ of that sub-
stance within the meaning of Article 3(12) and Article 5 of the reach 
Regulation.
44 It follows from all those considerations that the market referred to in 
the reach Regulation is the internal market and that therefore the 
expression ‘placing on the market’ relates to the internal market. Such 
an interpretation is not contradicted by any element of that regulation, 
especially since, when dealing with the release of substances outside the 
internal market, that regulation refers to the concept of export.
49 In light of all the foregoing conclusions, the answer to the question re-
ferred for a preliminary ruling is that Article 5 of the reach Regulation, 
read in conjunction with Article 3(12) of that regulation, must be inter-
preted as meaning that substances which have not be registered at the 
time of their import into the territory of the European Union in accord-
ance with that regulation may be exported outside that territory.
 On the Inclusion of the dehp Substance under Annex xiv to the 
reach Regulation
Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 11 May 2017 in Case T-115/15 – 
Deza, a.s., v European Chemicals Agency (echa)
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 Subject Matter and Judgment
This case concerns an action for annulment started by Deza a.s. seeking the an-
nulment of a decision of 12 December 2014 by the Executive Director of the echa 
by which the existing entry relating to the substance dehp on the list of identified 
substances with a view to their eventual inclusion in Annex xiv to the reach 
Regulation was supplemented to the effect that that substance is also identified 
as a substance with endocrine-disrupting properties that may have serious effects 
on the environment, within the meaning of Article 57( f ) of that Regulation. The 
General Court dismissed the action.
 Water Deterioration, Environmental Damage and Damage Covered 
by Authorization
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 1 June 2017 in Case C-529/15 – Gert 
Folk
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the Environ-
mental Liability Directive made by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative 
Court, Austria). Wasserkraftanlagen Mürzzuschlag GmbH operates, based on an 
authorisation granted in 1998, a hydroelectric power station on the river Mürz, in 
Austria, which, according to Mr Folk, caused significant environmental damage, 
as it disrupted the natural reproduction of fish and has caused fish to die along 
extended stretches of the river Mürz. The application based on environmental 
damage brought by Mr. Folk was dismissed at first instance as the national court 
considered the damage alleged by Mr. Folk, who own fishing rights for the river 
Mürz, covered by the authorisation granted by law. In appeal, Mr. Folk alleged 
that national law infringed the Environmental Liability Directive. The Admin-
istrative Court hearing the appeal raised several questions to the Court of Jus-
tice, among which, whether the Directive precludes a provision of national law 
which excludes that damage be categorised as ‘environmental damage’ in the 
case where such damage is covered by an authorisation granted under that law. 
Moreover, it asked whether Articles 12 and 13 of the Directive preclude a provision 
of national law, which does not entitle persons holding fishing rights to initiate a 
review procedure in relation to environmental damage.
 Key Findings
34 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the answer to the 
third question is that Directive 2004/35, and in particular Article 2(1)(b) 
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which excludes, generally and automatically, that damage which has 
a significant adverse effect on the ecological, chemical or quantitative 
status or ecological potential of the water in question be categorised as 
‘environmental damage’, due to the mere fact that it is covered by an au-
thorisation granted under that law.
49 An interpretation of national law which would deprive all persons hold-
ing fishing rights of the right to initiate a review procedure following 
environmental damage resulting in an increase in the mortality of fish, 
although those persons are directly affected by that damage, does not 
respect the scope of Articles 12 and 13 and is thus incompatible with that 
directive.
50 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second 
question is that Article 12 and 13 of Directive 2004/35 must be interpreted 
as precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the case 
in the main proceedings, which does not entitle persons holding fishing 
rights to initiate a review procedure in relation to environmental damage 
within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of that directive.
 On the Compatibility of the res Directive with the Provisions on 
the Free Movement of Goods
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 June 2017 in Case C-549/15 – 
e.on Biofor Sverige ab
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 18(1) 
of the Renewable Energy Sources Directive. The request had been made in pro-
ceedings between e.on Biofor Sverige ab (‘e.on’) and Statens energimyndighet 
(National Energy Agency, Sweden; ‘the se’) concerning an order sent by it to e.on 
as regards the biogas sustainability verification system put into place by the se. 
e.on, a company established in Sweden, has shown before the referring court that 
it purchases, from a sister company established in Germany, consignments of sus-
tainable biogas produced by the latter in that Member State. e.on then trans-
ports those consignments to Sweden via the German and Danish gas networks, 
that biogas remaining, at each stage of the transport, the property of companies 
in the group and remain at all times covered by an REDCert de sustainability 
certificate issued in accordance with the  German national mass balance verifica-
tion system. The se ordered e.on to ensure that the mass balance was achieved 
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‘within a location with a clear boundary’. Compliance with that order has the con-
sequence that the biogas produced in Germany which e.on imports into Sweden 
via the German and Danish gas networks cannot be included in that verification 
system. The national court hearing the dispute between e.on and se wanted to 
know in essence whether Article 18(1) of the Renewable Energy Sources Directive 
must be interpreted as placing an obligation on the Member States to authorise 
imports, via their interconnected national gas networks, of sustainable biogas. By 
its second question, the referring court asks whether Article 18(1) of the Renewable 
Energy Sources Directive is valid in the light of Article 34 tfeu, since the applica-
tion of that provision can have the effect of restricting trade in sustainable biogas.
 Key Findings
38 Such a provision cannot be interpreted as meaning that it gives rise to 
an obligation on the Member States to authorise imports of sustainable 
biogas via their interconnected gas networks.
56 It follows from the foregoing that the view cannot be taken that Article 
18(1) of Directive 2009/28 makes it impossible, as such, in a situation of 
movement of sustainable biogas between the Member States via inter-
connected national gas networks, for the sustainability of that gas to be 
recognised in the Member State of import for the purposes set out in 
Article 17(1) of that directive, nor, therefore, that Article 18(1) thereof thus 
constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods guaranteed under 
Article 34 tfeu.
 From Waste Incineration to Environmental Damage and Related 
Liability of Land Owners
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 13 July 2017 in Case C-129/16 – 
Túrkevei Tejtermelő Kft
 Subject Matter
The present request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of 
Articles 191 and 193 tfeu and of the Environmental Liability Directive. The re-
quest has been made in a dispute between Túrkevei Tejtermelő Kft. (‘ttk’) and 
the Országos Környezetvédelmi és Természetvédelmi Főfelügyelőség (National 
inspectorate general for the protection of the environment and nature, Hungary; 
‘the inspectorate’) concerning a fine imposed on ttk as a result of illegal waste in-
cineration occurring on land belonging to it and which resulted in air pollution. In 
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its administrative decision to reject tkk’s request of administrative review of the 
fine, the inspectorate took the view that the incineration of waste in an open space 
had caused an environmental hazard. According to the law on  environmental 
protection, persons who own or are in possession of the property at the material 
time are to be held jointly and severally liable, except where the owner can prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that it cannot be held responsible. Given that the les-
see of the land had died, the Lower Environmental Protection Agency maintained 
that it was fully entitled to hold ttk responsible. The national court hearing the 
dispute asked, in essence, whether the provisions of the Directive, read in light of 
the Polluter Pays Principle, must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which identi-
fies, in addition to operators using the land on which unlawful pollution has been 
produced, another category of person which is jointly liable for such environmen-
tal damage, namely the owners of the land, without it being necessary to establish 
a causal link between the conduct of the owners and the pollution found to have 
occurred. moreover, it wanted to know whether the Directive allowed the imposi-
tion of a fine.
 Key Findings
46 By contrast, if the referring court should find that the air pollution at is-
sue in the main proceedings has also caused damage or given rise to an 
imminent threat of such damage to water, land or protected natural spe-
cies or habitats, such air pollution would come within the scope of Direc-
tive 2004/35.
53 It is apparent from all of the foregoing that the liability mechanism es-
tablished by Directive 2004/35 is founded on the precautionary principle 
and on the polluter-pays principle. To that end, that directive places op-
erators under a duty both to prevent and to remedy environmental dam-
age (see, inter alia, judgment of 9 March 2010, erg and Others, C-379/08 
and C-380/08, eu:c:2010:127, paragraph 75).
54 In the present case, it is not in dispute that ttk was held liable in its ca-
pacity not as operator, but as owner of the land on which the pollution 
occurred. It also appears—this being a matter for the referring court to 
verify—that the competent authority imposed a fine on ttk and did not 
also require it to undertake preventive or remedial measures.
55 It is therefore apparent from the documents submitted to the Court that 
the provisions of Hungarian legislation applied to ttk do not form part 
of those which implement the liability mechanism established by Direc-
tive 2004/35.
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56 However, it must be noted that Article 16 of Directive 2004/35 grants 
Member States the power to maintain or adopt more stringent provisions 
in relation to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, 
including the identification of additional activities to be subject to the 
prevention and remediation requirements of that directive and the iden-
tification of additional responsible parties.
68 Accordingly, the answer to the second question is that Article 16 of Di-
rective 2004/35 and Article 193 tfeu must be interpreted, to the extent 
that the situation at issue in the main proceedings comes within the 
scope of Directive 2004/35, as not precluding national legislation, such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings, pursuant to which the own-
ers of land on which unlawful pollution has been produced are not 
only held to be jointly liable, alongside the persons using that land, for 
such environmental damage, but may also have fines imposed on them 
by the competent national authority, provided that such legislation is 
appropriate for the purpose of contributing to the attainment of the 
objective of more stringent protection and that the methods for de-
termining the amount of the fine do not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain that objective, this being a matter for the national court to 
establish.
 On the Inclusion of Chromium Trioxide to Annex xiv to the reach 
Regulation
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 July 2017 In Case C-651/15P – 
Verein zur Wahrung von Einsatz und Nutzung von Chromtrioxid und 
anderen Chrom-vi-Verbindungen in der Oberflächentechnik eV (vecco) and 
Others
 Subject Matter and Judgment
This appeal case originated from the request made by vecco and other appel-
lants seeking to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European 
Union in case T-360/13, vecco and Others v Commission, by which that court 
dismissed their action for partial annulment of Commission Regulation (eu) No 
348/2013 adding, among others, chromium trioxide to Annex xiv to the reach 
Regulation, without any exemptions under Article 58(2) of that regulation be-
ing granted for certain uses or categories of uses of that substance. The Court of 
Justice dismisses the action.
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 On the Concept of ‘Decision-making Process’ in the Context of 
Access to Environmental Information and Exceptions Thereto
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 July 2017 in Case C-60/15P – Saint-
Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH
 Subject Matter
This appeal case originated from the request made by Saint-Gobain Glass 
Deutschland GmbH (‘Saint-Gobain’), asking the Court to set aside the judgment 
of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-476/12, Saint-Gobain Glass 
Deutschland v Commission, by which that court dismissed its action for annul-
ment of the Commission’s decision of 17 January 2013 refusing full access to the 
list communicated by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Commission con-
taining information relating to certain installations of Saint-Gobain, situated on 
German territory, relating to provisional allocations and activities and capacity 
levels in relation to carbon dioxide (co2) emissions between 2005 and 2010, the 
efficiency of the installations and the annual emission quotas provisionally allo-
cated for the period between 2013 and 2020. In support of its appeal, Saint-Gobain 
puts forward, in essence, two grounds of appeal. Most importantly, the first 
ground, divided into two parts, is based on an incorrect interpretation of the first 
subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, read in conjunction with 
the second sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, in that the General 
Court, first, made an extensive interpretation of those provisions and, second, did 
not hold that, in the case before it, there was an overriding public interest justify-
ing disclosure of the environmental information requested.
 Key Findings
75 The General Court’s interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 
4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, confusing as it does the concepts of 
decision-making process and administrative procedure, has the effect of 
expanding the scope of the exception to the right of access provided for 
by that provision to the point where it allows a European Union institu-
tion to refuse access to any document, including documents containing 
environmental information, held by that institution, in so far as that doc-
ument directly relates to matters dealt with as part of an administrative 
procedure pending before that institution.
76 Yet the concept of ‘decision-making process’ referred to in that provision 
must be construed as relating to decision-making, without covering the 
entire administrative procedure which led to the decision.
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86 Given the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is that, in not hav-
ing interpreted the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 
1049/2001 strictly as required by the second sentence of Article 6(1) of 
Regulation No 1367/2006, the General Court erred in law.
87 Consequently, as the first part of the first ground of appeal is well found-
ed, the judgment under appeal must be set aside, without its being nec-
essary to examine the second part of the first ground of appeal or the 
second ground of appeal.
 On the Validity of Decision 2011/278/eu on the Allocation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 July 2017 in Case C-80/16 – Arce-
lorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine sasu
 Subject Matter and Judgment
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the validity of Commission Deci-
sion 2011/278/eu determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free 
allocation of emission allowances. ArcelorMittal Atlantique et Lorraine sasu, 
an operator of greenhouse gas-emitting installations, contested the legality of 
the decree adopted by the ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et 
de l’Énergie (Minister for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, France, 
‘the Minister’), implementing Decision 2011/287/eu. The tribunal administratif de 
Montreuil (Administrative Court, Montreuil, France) hearing the case decided 
to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to the court of Justice. The Court of 
Justice revealed nothing that could affect the validity of Commission Decision 
2011/278/eu.
 On the Regularisation of Plants Built without an eia
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 July 2017 in Joined Cases C-196/16 
and C-197/16 – Comune di Corridonia and Others
 Subject Matter
The present requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. These requests have been 
made in the context of proceedings between, on the one hand, the Comune 
di Corridonia and other municipalities and, on the other hand, the  Provincia 
 103Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
journal for european environmental & planning law 15 (2018) 85-109
<UN>
di Macerata (Province of Macerata, Italy), concerning decisions by which 
that province found that plants for the generation of electrical energy from 
biogas belonging to vbio1 Società Agricola Srl (‘vbio1’) and vbio2 Società 
Agricola Srl (‘vbio2’) were compliant with environmental standards. Both es-
tablishments had been built without an environmental assessment, but their 
authorisation had been annulled because the law exempting them from an en-
vironmental impact assessment was in breach of the Directive according to 
the Italian Council of State. Upon resubmission of the authorisation requests 
the environmental impact assessments then made concluded that both plants 
were compatible with environmental requirements. Several municipalities chal-
lenged these decisions leading the Italian court to ask whether Article 2 of Di-
rective 2011/92, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, mean 
that the failure to carry out an environmental impact assessment of a plant 
project required pursuant to Directive 85/337 cannot be regularised, follow-
ing the annulment of consent granted in respect of that plant, by such an as-
sessment being carried out after that plant has been built and has entered into 
operation.
 Key Findings
34 However, neither Directive 85/337 nor Directive 2011/92 contains provi-
sions relating to the consequences of a breach of that obligation to carry 
out a prior assessment.
37 The Court has, however, held that eu law does not preclude national 
rules which, in certain cases, permit the regularisation of operations or 
measures which are unlawful in the light of eu law (judgments of 3 July 
2008, Commission v Ireland, C-215/06, eu:c:2008:380, paragraph 57; of 15 
January 2013, Križan and Others, C-416/10, eu:c:2013:8, paragraph 87; and 
of 17 November 2016, Stadt Wiener Neustadt, C-348/15, eu:c:2016:882, para-
graph 36).
38 The Court has made it clear that such a possible regularisation would 
have to be subject to the condition that it does not offer the persons con-
cerned the opportunity to circumvent the rules of eu law or to dispense 
with their application, and that it should remain the exception (judg-
ments of 3 July 2008, Commission v Ireland, C-215/06, eu:c:2008:380, 
paragraph 57; of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C-416/10, eu:c:2013:8, 
paragraph 87; and of 17 November 2016, Stadt WienerNeustadt, C-348/15, 
eu:c:2016:882, paragraph 36).
39 Consequently, the Court has held that legislation which attaches the 
same effects to regularisation permission, which can be issued even 
where no exceptional circumstances are proved, as those attached to 
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prior planning consent fails to have regard for the requirements of Direc-
tive 85/337 (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 2008, Commission v 
Ireland, C-215/06, eu:c:2008:380, paragraph 61, and of 17 November 2016, 
Stadt Wiener Neustadt, C-348/15, eu:c:2016:882, paragraph 37).
41 Furthermore, an assessment carried out after a plant has been construct-
ed and has entered into operation cannot be confined to its future impact 
on the environment, but must also take into account its environmental 
impact from the time of its completion.
 On Urban Waste Water Treatment in Certain Greek Agglomerations
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 September 2017 in Case C-320/15 – 
European Commission v Hellenic Republic
 Subject Matter
By this infringement procedure, the European Commission requested the Court 
of Justice to declare that, by not having ensured an appropriate level of treatment 
of urban waste water from the agglomerations of Prosotsani, Doxato, Eleftherou-
poli, Vagia, Galatista, Desfina and Chanioti, the Hellenic Republic has failed to 
fulfil its obligations under the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive.
 Key Findings
25 It follows that, as at the date set in the additional reasoned opinion, dis-
charges of urban waste water from the agglomerations of Prosotsani, 
Doxato, Eleftheroupoli, Vagia and Galatista—as the Hellenic Republic 
has conceded—did not comply with Article 4(1) of Directive 91/271.
35 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that, by not 
having ensured secondary or equivalent treatment of urban waste water 
from the agglomerations of Prosotsani, Doxato, Eleftheroupoli, Vagia and 
Galatista
 On the Taxation of Electricity Generated by Wind Power Plants
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 September 2017 in Joined Cases 
C-215/16, C-216/16, C-220/16 and C-221/16 – Elecdey Carcelen sa and Others
 Subject Matter
These requests for a preliminary ruling concern a levy imposed on wind power 
plants designed to produce electricity by the the Comunidad Autónoma de 
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 Castilla-La Mancha (Autonomous Community of Castilla-La-Mancha, Spain). 
Elecdey Carcelen sa and other wind power plants operators challenged the le-
gality of this charge. The national court hearing the case asked, in essence, 
whether the Renewable Energy Sources Directive or Council Directive 2003/96/ec 
restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity precludes the application of a levy on wind turbines designed to pro-
duce electricity.
 Key Findings
37 It follows that neither Article 3(1) to (3) of Directive 2009/28, read in con-
junction with subparagraph (k) of the second subparagraph of Article 2 
and Annex i to that directive, nor subparagraph (e) of the second sub-
paragraph of Article 13(1) thereof prohibit Member States from imposing 
a levy, such as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, on wind 
turbines designed to produce electricity.
51 Consequently, there is no connection between, on the one, hand, the op-
erative event for the levy at issue in the cases in the main proceedings 
and, on the other, the actual production of electricity by wind turbines, 
and even less the consumption of electricity generated by them (see, by 
analogy, judgments of 10 June 1999, Braathens, C-346/97, eu:c:1999:291, 
paragraphs 22 and 23; of 4 June 2015, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, C-5/14, 
eu:c:2015:354, paragraphs 61 to 65; and of 1 October 2015, okg, C-606/13, 
eu:c:2015:636, paragraphs 31 to 35).
52 It follows that a levy, such as that at issue in the cases in the main proceed-
ings, does not tax electricity within the meaning of Directive 2003/96.
53 Accordingly, a levy, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
applies to wind turbines designed to produce electricity, does not fall 
within the scope of that directive, such as it is as defined in Article 1 and 
Article 2(1) and (2) thereof.
 On the Need of Scientific Evidence to Justify the Reduction of the 
Size of a Natura 2000 Site
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 October 2017 In Case C-281/16 – 
Vereniging Hoekschewaards Landschap
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling has been made in proceedings between 
the Vereniging Hoekschewaards Landschap and the Staatssecretaris van 
 Economische Zaken (State Secretary for Economic Affairs, Netherlands) (‘the 
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State Secretary’) concerning the legality of a decision to reduce the size of a 
special area of conservation (‘the sac’) which was implemented by Commis-
sion Implementing Decision (eu) 2015/72 adopting an eighth update of the list 
of sites of Community importance for the Atlantic biogeographical region. Ac-
cording to the Netherlands and the Commission, the inclusion of the Leen-
heerenpolder in the sac was based on a scientific error as other areas sufficed 
to achieve the conservation goals of the Haringvliet sci. The Dutch Council of 
State hearing the case asked, in essence, whether the reduction in the size of 
the Haringvliet site by excluding the Leenheerenpolder, on the ground that 
the initial inclusion of the latter in the site was the result of a scientific error, is 
valid.
 Key Findings
36 As the Advocate General has observed in point 28 of her Opinion, as the 
inclusion of a site in the list gives rise to the presumption that it is rel-
evant in its entirety from the point of view of the Habitats Directive’s 
objective of conserving natural habitats and wild fauna and flora, a pro-
posal by a Member State to reduce the size of a site placed on that list re-
quires proof that the areas in question do not have a substantial interest 
in achieving that objective at national level. In addition, the Commission 
may accept and implement the proposal only if it concludes that those 
areas are also not necessary from the perspective of the entire European 
Union.
38 In that respect, the Netherlands Government confirmed, at the hearing, 
that the Kingdom of the Netherlands had not invoked the existence of a 
‘scientific error’ at the time it submitted to the Commission its proposal 
to reduce the size of the Haringvliet sci.
39 Furthermore, for its part, the Commission has provided to the Court no 
conclusive scientific evidence capable of proving that such an error had 
vitiated the initial proposal.
40 Therefore, at the occasion of the eighth update of the list of scis in the 
Atlantic biogeographical region by Implementing Decision 2015/72, the 
Commission could not, lawfully, rely on the existence of an initial scien-
tific error in order to place the Haringvliet site on that list without includ-
ing the Leenheerenpolder.
41 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that Imple-
menting Decision 2015/72 is invalid, in so far as, by that decision, the Har-
ingvliet site was placed on the list of scis for the Atlantic biogeographical 
region without the inclusion of the Leenheerenpolder.
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 On the Inclusion of Acrylamide under the reach Regulation 
Framework
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 October 2017 in Case C-650/15P – 
Polyelectrolyte Producers Group geie (ppg) and snf sas
 Subject Matter and Judgment
By this appeal, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group geie (ppg) and snf sas ask the 
Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European 
Union in case T-268/10 renv, ppg and snf v echa, by which that Court dismissed 
their action for annulment of the decision of the European Chemicals Agency 
(echa), identifying acrylamide as a substance meeting the criteria laid down in 
Article 57 of the reach Regulation. The Court of Justice dismisses the action.
 On the Classification of Pitch, Coal Tar, High-temperature as an 
Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 Substance
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 22 November 2017 in Case C-691/15P – 
European Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes sa and Others
 Subject Matter and Judgment
By this appeal, the European Commission seeks to have set aside the judgment 
of the General Court of the European Union in case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquit-
ranes and Others v Commission, by which the General Court annulled Commis-
sion Regulation (eu) No 944/2013 in so far as it classifies pitch, coal tar, high-
temperature as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance. The Court of 
Justice dismisses the appeal.
 Editor’s Appraisal of the Reported Case Law
Given the length of the overview of judgments section, I will limit this ap-
praisal to highlight an at times forgotten pattern in the manner in which the 
Court of Justice addresses the room for discretion of eu and national authori-
ties in the field of eu environmental law. Indeed, the case law assessed in the 
period under consideration in this appraisal confirms that the most common 
approach by the Court of Justice to the discretionary power of the Member 
States and eu institutions under eu environmental law is a functional one, ie 
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the discretionary power must be functional to the achievement of the envi-
ronmental goals of the relevant eu measure. Indeed, Case C-142/16, Commis-
sion v Germany, in the context of nature conservation confirms the case law of 
the Court in Briels1 and Orleans.2  In short, Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive sets strict conditions for appropriate assessments, significantly restricting 
Member States’ discretion as regards the classification of measures aiming at 
reducing environmental harms of plans and projects as mitigation measures.3 
To remain within the realm of the Habitats Directive, in Case C-281/1, Verenig-
ing Hoekshewaards Landschap, the Court of Justice restricted Member States 
and Commission discretion to reduce the size of Natura 2000 sites by underly-
ing the need of scientific evidence to sustain restrictions. In a different, but 
related manner, in the C-529/15, Gert Folk, the Court of Justice restricted the 
discretion of national authorities to rely on the permit defense under the En-
vironmental Liability Directive. Permit authorizations cannot lead to the re-
duction of the scope of application of the Directive. On the contrary, in Case 
C-129/16, Túrkevei Tejtermelő, the Court of Justice seems to recognize some dis-
cretionary power to the Member States in the context of the Environmental 
Liability Directive when it comes to the adoption of more stringent protective 
measures to redress environmental damage. National authorities are allowed 
to hold land owners responsible to redress environmental damage caused by 
operators renting the land. Similarly, in Case C-335/16, vg Čistoća, the Court 
of Justice recognized some discretion to Member States on how to calculate 
and allocate the costs associate to waste treatment. A discretion confirmed as 
regards the taxation of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in 
Joined Cases C-215/16, C-216/16, C-220/16 and C-221/16, Elecdey Carcelen sa and 
Others. The picture that emerges from the above is that discretion is allowed to 
the extent that it is functional to the achievement of the environmental goals 
of the relevant eu environmental measure. This finding should not come as a 
surprise given the teleological approach of the Court of Justice in the interpre-
tation of eu (environmental) law. Still, it remains an important finding given 
the reluctance of certain parties to interpret eu environmental law in light of 
its environmental goals, and give precedence to short term economic interests.
1 Case C-521/12, T.C. Briels and Others v Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu [2014] 
ecli:eu:c:2014:330.
2 Joined Cases C-387/15 and 388/15, Hilde Orleans and Others v Vlaams Gewest [2016] 
ecli:eu:c:2016:583.
3 See recently hierover, H. Schoukens, ‘Habitats Restoration Measures as Facilitators for Eco-
nomic Development within the Context of eu Habitats Directive: Balancing No Net Loss 
with the Preventive Approach?’ (2017) 29(1) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 47–73.
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It is in this light that the judgment in Case C-488/15, Commission v Bulgaria, 
is a welcome confirmation of the jurisprudential line set by the Court of Justice 
in the Janacek,4 rwe5 and ClientEarth6 cases. To Ludwig Kramer the honor of 
underlying the importance of this judgment in his annotation.
4 Case C-237/07, Janecek v Freistaat Bayern, ecli:eu:c:2008:447.
5 Joined cases C-165/09 to C-167/09, Stichting Natuur en Milieu en anderen v College van 
 Gedeputeerde Staten van Groningen (C-165/09) and College van Gedeputeerde Staten van 
Zuid- Holland (C-166/09 en C-167/09), ecli:eu:c:2011:348 (rwe).
6 C-404/13, ClientEarth, eu:c:2014:2382.
